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The Politics of Fertility:
Population and Pronatalism in Ladakh
In India’s northwestern region of Ladakh, the linkage between reproduction, politics, and fertility
is both complicated and contested, evident in increasing population discourses and the re-emergence
of a Buddhist pronatalist movement. This paper examines the impacts of population discourses and
pronatalism on women’s reproductive decision-making, as well as on the delivery of healthcare throughout
Ladakh. Population discourses currently circulating produce two reproductive subjects—the “hyperfertile Muslim woman” and the “vulnerable Buddhist”—both of which have been central in revitalizing
Buddhist pronatalism. Data collected through a hospital-based survey and interviews shows that fertility
behavior is shaped by religious interpretations, political mobilization, and pressure to be culturally loyal.
Fertility decisions are not simply about one’s reproductive choices and desires—but are instead situated
in a contested context where Ladakhis are worried about culture loss. While these cultural pressures
differently impact Muslim and Buddhist women, the growing politicization of reproduction results in
continued ethnic/religious conflict that has far-ranging impacts throughout the region.

A Buddhist woman walks into the maternal
child health (MCH) ward at Leh’s Sonam Norboo
Memorial (SNM) hospital with a baby strapped to
her back, tied in the traditional way: with the baby
lying flat against the mother’s back and a tight knot
tied in the front of the mother’s chest. She enters the
crowded MCH ward hesitantly. A young nurse barks
at her, “Achay-le [sister], sit here,” pointing to the
crowded bench in the hall. When it is the woman’s
turn to give her reproductive health history, she shyly
bows her head and whispers, “I’m here for the copper
T.1” When asked how many children she has, she
says that though she has two children, she has been
pregnant four times. “Family planning is a sin but
I like family planning too,” she explains. The next
patient, a 23-year-old Muslim mother of two, echoes
this view: “I am using a copper T but people tell me
that I should remove it…but I have a small baby
and I want the gap,” she asserts. Family planning
is controversial in Ladakh. Though Buddhist and
Muslim women both describe family planning as a
sin, they also express how grateful they are to space
their pregnancies. Doctors also have conflicted
1. Copper T is a type of intrauterine device (IUD) that is
common in India.

feelings about family planning: “family planning is
good; you shouldn’t bring (up) an unwanted child,”
a female surgeon said, “though I’m worried because
the population growth rate is declining so one day
the Ladakhi population will be extinct, especially
the Buddhist population; I’m worried on the whole.”
Family planning—which was unproblematic
just over a decade ago—is becoming politicized
and increasingly linked to ethnic and religious
conflict. Public support for family planning has
waned while religious opposition to particular
contraceptive methods and practices has escalated
(Smith, 2009a, 2009b). Furthermore, population
concerns have led to the emergence of a Leh-based
pronatalist movement that targets Buddhist women,
encouraging them to “out breed” the Muslims. Yet
these fertility politics impact Buddhist and Muslim
women differently; high fertility is encouraged
for Buddhists but is thought by many Ladakhis to
indicate the “backwardness” of Muslims. Taken
together, this indicates the multiple ways that
reproduction in Ladakh is “stratified,” where
power relations—especially those in the religious
and political spheres—are shaping reproductive
practices and ideologies (Ginsberg and Rapp, 1995).
In this article, I show how the population discourses
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circulating throughout Ladakh produce two reproductive
subjects—the “hyper-fertile Muslim woman” and the
“vulnerable Buddhist.” These discourses are generating a
pronatalist movement and are escalating hospital politics,
both of which impact women’s reproductive decisionmaking and the delivery of healthcare throughout Ladakh.
In this way, reproduction has become a space not only for
identity politics between groups but also for real politics that
impact the lives of Ladakhi women. As a result of growing
reproductive politics, there is a disjuncture between idealized
subjectivity (cultural pressures regarding fertility behavior)
and practice (women’s actual fertility practices). This split
subjectivity—where women and gynecologists both monitor
their statements and practices regarding fertility and family
planning—indicates what kind of strategies are needed
when reproduction becomes so highly politicized.
Based on data compiled during 16 months of research in
Ladakh between 2006-2011, I show that fertility practices of
Buddhist and Muslim women do not align with the religious
and political discourses from their respective communities.
Research was conducted among women, men, medical staff,
religious authorities, and political leaders in both urban
(Leh, Kargil) and rural (Diskit) sites, using four methods:
interviews, participant observation, a survey, and archival
research. I conducted semi-structured interviews with a
diverse pool of women—Buddhist, Muslim, rural, urban,
married, and unmarried—as well as with men, adolescents,
medical staff; NGO workers; and religious and political
leaders. I conducted a hospital-based survey with 237
women in Ladakh’s largest hospitals (Leh, Kargil, Diskit)
that generated data on contraceptive use and knowledge;
fertility rates and preference; delivery history and preference;
and attitudes towards family planning. Women’s opinions on
family planning—where most supported it, yet also called
it a sin—were expressed in semi-structured interviews as
well as through my hospital survey. Participant observation
in hospitals allowed me to witness interactions between
patients and medical staff, as well as deliveries, surgeries,
gynecological exams, and prenatal check ups. Archival
research was conducted in order to understand the history of
ethnic/religious conflict and population trends.

POPULATION GROWTH AND POPULATION
DISCOURSES
Ladakh is a high-altitude region cut off from the rest
of India during winter, which exacerbates already-existing
sentiments of political marginalization.2 Ladakhi Muslims
complain that Buddhists dominate regional politics, while
2. Frustrated with the lack of regional representation and cognizant
of Jammu and Kashmir’s status as the only Muslim majority state, many
Ladakhis feel doubly marginalized—by both the state and the Indian nation
(Bhan, 2006). J&K state has special status under the Indian Constitution,
where Article 370 stipulates that while the Indian Parliament can determine
issues of defense, communications and Foreign Affairs, all other laws
require acceptance from the J&K state government.
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Buddhists perceive themselves as a minority within a
Muslim-controlled state government (van Beek, 2004). With
Ladakhis making up less than 2.3 percent of Jammu and
Kashmir state’s population, competition among Buddhists
and Muslims for the few government seats is fierce.3 This is
reflected regionally, as Leh district has a Buddhist majority
(77 percent) while Kargil district has a Muslim majority (80
percent).4 Though this sense of political marginalization is
both widely shared by Ladakhis and has persisted over time,
it underlies the current perception of a population crisis.
Those who worry about Ladakh’s future often advocate
positions that appear contradictory, such as simultaneously
supporting family planning and pronatalism. Dundup,5
a young married man in Leh who works for a local nongovernmental organization (NGO), explained the importance
of children to the Buddhist community: “We should have at
least four or five children…having two is not enough. Ladakh
is a very big place and we don’t have the problem of poverty
like the rest of India… for our generation we did a very wrong
thing [referring to the Indian government’s National Family
Planning program], we are killing our generation.” Like many
Ladakhis, Dundup has a strong pronatalist position, based
on his perception that the Ladakhi population—specifically
Ladakh’s Buddhist population—is in decline. This perception
is fueled by broader Buddhist concerns that Buddhism is
weakening and under threat, though this relies upon earlier
histories of Buddhist/Muslim conflict (van Beek, 2001). Yet
Dundup also advocates family planning, adolescent sexual
health education, and access to contraception. For Dundup,
the message of pronatalism (“reproduce more”) and family
planning (“a small family is a happy family”) do not conflict.
Neither pronatalism nor family planning are new to
Ladakh, but what is new is the heightened sense of controversy
that surrounds them both. While population numbers are
currently politically charged, fears of a growing Muslim
population have long existed among Ladakh’s Buddhists
(Bray, 1991; van Beek, 2004).6 Pronatalist activism does
more than just encourage women to continue reproducing; it
also takes a clear position against contraception, specifically
permanent methods such as ligation (permanent female
sterilization). Family planning—which was first introduced
in Ladakh during the early 1980s—has been instrumental
in changing contraceptive behavior, even as it also evokes
controversy. Together, pronatalism and family planning
generate a complicated population discourse that affects the
delivery of reproductive healthcare.
This discourse links population strength with cultural
3. There is one Member of Parliament (MP) seat for Ladakhis in the
central government. In the J&K state government, there are four Member of
Legislative Assembly (MLA) seats—two for Kargil and two for Leh.
4. See Leh district and Kargil district websites (
and http://kargil.
nic.in/).
5. Dundup is a pseudonym, as are all other names in this piece.
6. Pronatalist activism emerged in the 1930s among the Buddhist
pandit community in Srinagar. See van Beek (2004) for more details on the
Kashmir Raj Bodhi Maha Sabha.

strength, such as the Buddhist doctor who explained, “to
preserve our Ladakhi culture, our population should be
higher. We should have more population.” While some worry
about population growth, others worry about population
composition, specifically that of Muslims and Buddhists.
Although they have similar population numbers and growth
rates (see Tables 1 and 2), it is common for each group to
state that they are in the minority (Bray, 1991; Gutschow,
2006).7 These kinds of claims made by Ladakhis reflect
India’s national reservation policy, a form of affirmative
action intended for historically disadvantaged groups, which
follows caste groupings and tribal affiliations (i.e. Scheduled
Caste and Scheduled Tribe status). Since population worries
and declarations of minority status rely upon numbers,
practices of counting have become more politicized.
There is little consensus on Ladakh’s population
numbers, trends, and composition. Population data is
limited and unreliable, as there are inconsistencies between
data from the Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) state, the
national census, Ladakh’s health department, NGOs, and
independent research groups. As shown in Tables 1 and 2,
Ladakh’s population is small (290,492) compared to other
regions of India, though it has been steadily growing since
the 1970s, even as the growth rate has been declining since

2001 (Guilmoto & Rajan, 2002; Jina, 1996, Government of
India, 2001, 2011).8
What is striking in the following tables is the shift in
population composition that occurred between 2001 and
2011, which is calculated at the district level rather than by
specific religious group. While it might appear that in ten
years (2001-2011) the region moved from a Muslim majority
to a Buddhist majority, Muslims still remain the majority
by a small margin, even though the Buddhist population is
currently growing faster. In 2001, the census showed that
the population of Buddhist-majority Leh district had fallen
behind that of Kargil district. Yet, by 2011, Leh district had
surpassed Kargil, likely due to efforts to encourage Buddhist
reproduction.
Interpreting these population composition shifts is not
an easy task, especially when both groups make minority
claims. Furthermore, while migration levels into the region
(i.e., Kashmiris, Nepalis) have steadily increased over recent
decades, migration is also susceptible to mistakes, such as
double counting, as well as the “politics of counting.”9 The
recent population growth rate in Leh district suggests that
Buddhist pronatalism and anti-family planning activism are
succeeding in changing fertility practices.

Table 1: Population by district
Total Population
1981 census
1991 census 10
2001 census
2011 census

Kargil district (Muslim-majority)
65,992
N/A
119,307
143,388

Leh district (Buddhist-majority)
68,380
89,474
117,232
147,104

(Government of India, 2001 Leh and Kargil government websites (http://leh.nic.in/ and http://kargil.nic.in/)
Table 2: Population growth rate by district
Population Growth Rate
1991-2001
2001-2011

Kargil district (Muslim-majority)
33.55
20.18

Leh district (Buddhist-majority)
30.15
25.48

(Government of India, 2001, 2011)

7. The remaining minority of Ladakh’s population is comprised of
Christians, Sikhs, and Hindu families (Government of India, 2001, 2011).

8. Also see http://www.nfhsindia.org/ and http://www.measuredhs.
com/.
9. The 2011 census initially reported Ladakh as having the highest
child sex ratio in India, which was due to counting the military.
10. Due to civil unrest, there is no census data for Kargil district for
the 1991 census.
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“Demographic depiction” is the term Geoff Childs uses
to describe the deployment of population statistics and
representations in such a way that it will “justify a current
power structure or rationalize a state’s intervention in the
intimate realm of reproduction” (Childs, 2008: 211). This
occurs not only through the use of statistics to convey
scientific “truths” but also through the use of particular
language that adds subjective meanings onto numbers (such
as adjectives like “extreme” and “excessive” to describe
population trends). Demographic depiction illustrates how
power and knowledge work together, where institutions
of power, such as the state, can easily produce subjective
portrayals of the population, which are taken to be objective
(Childs, 2008; Foucault, 1997). Demographic depictions are
powerful because numbers can cause strong reverberations
throughout communities, as “demographic perceptions
about communities can lead to exactly the kind of political
and social instability that demographic events themselves
can” (Basu, 1996: 154). There are multiple explanations
for the changes in Ladakh’s population over the past few
decades, yet a general sense of worry about Ladakh’s
population future persists.11 Group struggles—specifically,
the relationship between the majority and minority—are
articulated in cultural terms, where struggles result in
demographic tensions and occasionally violence.
Population discourses in Ladakh—both that of Buddhists
and Muslims—fluctuate between expressions of competitive
demography and a sense of Ladakhi exceptionalism.
Competitive demography emerges from the pervasive feeling
of marginalization among Buddhists, who worry about their
population decline and are convinced that Muslims are “outbreeding” them. From their perspective, the diminishing
number of Buddhists indicates both the weakened state of
Buddhism and the likelihood of Muslim dominance in the
region. These population worries reinforce pervasive feelings
of political marginalization that are felt acutely in villages,
where rural to urban migration and the preference for secular
education are causing notable changes. For example, a lama
from Zangskar explained the rationale for more children, as
he linked population numbers with power in the community.
We need more births…we need to be more
influential…I told the villagers that we should
have more children: 6 per family at least. No
problem, we have a school, we have a gonpa,
we have a nunnery. We can take more people,
there’s no problem, I told them. More people
is more power. 500 people, 500 power. 1,000
people, 1,000 power. Then only we will be
heard.
11. These include the following: changing fertility practices
(decreasing polyandry, family planning and contraceptive use); changing
household structure (rural to urban migration); improvements in medical
care (increased life expectancy and decreased infant and maternal
mortality), and the decreasing strength of the monastic system.
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In addition to fears of a weakened Buddhism and weak
Buddhist political base, the competitive demography
discourse also characterizes growing Muslim fertility as a
threat. A growing number of Buddhists have blamed family
planning use for the decline of the Buddhist population.
They also explain the growth of the Muslim population as
due to Muslim women’s reluctance to use birth control. For
example, as a member of the Buddhist women’s group Ama
Tsogspa explained, “Muslim women didn’t do ligation or
spacing so their population is increasing and we (Buddhist
women) did ligation and spacing and so now our population
is decreasing.” Religion gets taken up in the competitive
demography discourse, where the presumed high fertility
of Muslims is associated with Islam, whereas Buddhists
point to their religious practices (the lama system and
historical polyandry) to explain their low fertility. Yet, these
characterizations of distinct Muslim and Buddhist positions
on fertility control overlook women’s actual support for
family planning, as well as the complexities of reproductive
decision-making in such a politicized context.
Though they have different explanations for population
change, Muslims and Buddhists express their distinct
experiences of regional marginality, which is articulated as
“Ladakhi exceptionalism.” This view argues that Ladakh’s
low population and low fertility distinguishes it from the
rest of India (Guilmoto & Rajan, 2002; Gutschow, 2006).
Because Ladakh’s culture is characterized as under threat—
from a range of “outside” influences including modernity
and the impact of foreigners—some community members
argue that Ladakh’s low population warrants its exclusion
from the national population policy. In November 2007, the
Ladakh Buddhist Association (LBA) requested the Jammu
and Kashmir state government to stop promoting family
planning in Ladakh, with the ex-president of LBA writing,
“The Ladakhi race has limited population in the country
and there is apprehension of its extinction. Hence, you are
requested not to apply small family norms in the district as
a special case” (Ul-Hassan, 2007). Similarly, the LBA has
also sent letters to SNM hospital that demand the stop of
tubal ligations and abortions (Smith, 2009a, 2009b). While
Ladakhi exceptionalism is most evident among Buddhists,
the sentiment that Ladakh is different from the rest of
India and has unique needs is also shared by Muslims.
Whatever shape the population discourse takes in Ladakh—
competitive demography or Ladakhi exceptionalism—the
population continues to be perceived as a problem that has
both political and reproductive ramifications.

“HYPER-FERTILE” MUSLIMS AND
“VULNERABLE” BUDDHISTS
Population discourses produce two kinds of reproductive
subjects: the “hyper-fertile Muslim woman” and the
“vulnerable Buddhist.” The construction of the “hyper-fertile
Muslim woman” relies on the idea that Muslim women are
linked closely with tradition, and that tradition means high

fertility. This perception of high Muslim fertility is deeply
entrenched and pervasive in India, particularly evident in
reports contrasting Muslim and Hindu fertility in demography
and development (Basu, 1996). The “vulnerable Buddhist”
subject is created through discourse that characterizes
Buddhism as weakening, often due to “outside” forces such
as modernity, tourism, and development (Crossette, 1996).
Like the “hyper-fertile Muslim,” the “vulnerable Buddhist”
subject relies upon broader regional debates within Asia,
where Buddhism is perceived as being “under threat.” These
two reproductive subjects are a powerful reminder of how
population is becoming a matter of social concern in Ladakh,
while also reflecting broader debates going on in South Asia
about modernity, development, and communalism.
Reproductive subjects have been at the receiving end
of a wide range of policies aimed at controlling fertility
and managing reproduction. The social body is controlled
through “technologies of sex,” where individual bodies are
disciplined and the population is managed simultaneously

leads to further assumptions that they would be opposed to
family planning. Yet, this is not reflected in my data, which
shows that Muslim women not only support family planning
(as an idea), but also are having far fewer children than is
typically assumed (see Table 3, 4, 5).12 Though Buddhist
women still had a lower average number of children, the
difference is not nearly as significant as the discourse would
suggest.
The average number of children is lowest in urban Leh
and Kargil and highest in rural Diskit, where contraceptive
methods are rarely available. This reflects not only the
importance of having children in rural areas but may also
reflect the increasing influence of pronatalism on Buddhist
women’s fertility. Yet, similar to what Geoff Childs found
in his research with Tibetan women in exile, fertility can
remain low even in the presence of a strong pronatalist
ideology (Childs, 2008). While Ladakhi Buddhists may
publically support pronatalist ideology, they still have low
fertility (1.98), which is lower that the total fertility rate (TFR)

Table 3: Average number of children ever born (CEB) by region and religion
Location
Leh
Kargil
Diskit
Average of three regions

Average # of children:
Muslim women
1.83
2.27
2.85
2.34

(Foucault, 1978). These technologies rely upon knowledge of
sexuality, population, and health, as well as the convergence
of political and economic interests on sexuality (morality
campaigns, ideologies of sexual responsibility, control of
reproductive choices). Women who willingly control their
fertility in compliance with state-sponsored population
control programs become sexually responsible subjects,
in that they enact the self-regulation of their sex life. India
has numerous incentive programs that encourage women to
discipline themselves. In Ladakh, women are paid by the
state if they deliver their child in a hospital, get an IUD/IUCD
inserted, or become sterilized. Practices that make one legible
to the state—i.e., adopting family planning or having an
institutional delivery—not only render one legitimate in the
eyes of the state but also have social and gendered meanings,
such as when particular practices are characterized as
“modern” or “backwards” (Kanaaneh, 2002). Certain sexual
practices—such as polyandry and arranged marriages—
are associated with tradition and viewed as “backwards,”
whereas “modern” sexual subjects are educated on sexual
risk and family planning (Abu Lughod, 2005).
Muslim women in Ladakh are presumed to be more
strongly linked to “tradition” than Buddhist women, which

Average # of children:
Buddhist women
1.66
2.0
2.27
1.98

Both Buddhist & Muslim
women
1.69
2.23
2.47
2.11

of Jammu and Kashmir state (3.0) and the nation (3.2).13
Though contraception is available, it is primarily
accessible to those in urban areas, since rural health posts
do not reliably stock contraceptives. Of the five methods
available,14 IUDs are the most common method across
12. My fertility data is based on conducting 237 hospital-based
interviews with Buddhist and Muslim women in three locations (Leh,
Kargil, and Diskit). My data reports on the average number of children
women are having (CEB, children ever born), not the total fertility rate
(TFR), which is calculated differently. The TFR reflects the average number
of children that would be born to a women during her reproductive
lifetime, calculated by averaging the average number of children for women
of each year of reproductive age. The low number of children ever born
(CEB) in Ladakh is due to fertility choices, rather than infant mortality,
which is fairly low for the region.
13. See Guilmoto and Rajan, 2002. The 2005-2006 National Family
Health Survey, conducted by the Jammu and Kashmir state, reports a
different TFR for the Jammu and Kashmir state (2.4) and the Indian state
(2.7). Though calculating TFR differs from calculating the average number
of children, it is evident that Ladakhi fertility is low in comparison to the
state and region. Working from a small sample size, Sara Smith reports a
higher number of children for women in Leh district, with a mean number
of children for Buddhists (3.18); Sunnis (2.44); and Shi’as (3.25).
14. IUD/IUCD (intrauterine device); male and female sterilization
(tubectomies, laparoscopic ligation, and male vasectomy); condoms, birth
control pills, and injectable hormones (Depo-Provera).

The Politics of Fertility/Aengst

27

Ladakh, as they do not require additional resupply or regular
check-ups, appealing to rural women who have travel far
distances to health centers. Along with IUDs, sterilization
(ligation) is another popular method of contraception. That
permanent and long-acting contraceptive methods are most
used in Ladakh is not surprising, given the government
incentive schemes that encourage their use.15 My research
shows contraceptive use to be high among Ladakhi women,
evidenced by the number of women who reported using (or
having used) contraceptives, along with statements from
interviews about desires to space their family (see Table
4). Among women interviewed at the three hospitals (Leh,
Kargil, Diskit), the average percentage of contraceptive use
is 75 percent. Regionally, contraceptive use was highest
in Leh (80 percent), followed by Diskit (75 percent) and
then Kargil (62 percent). While the average contraceptive
use of Buddhist women is higher (80 percent) than that of
Muslim women (65 percent), the rate of Muslim women’s
contraceptive use is still higher than India’s national average
(56 percent) or that of the Jammu and Kashmir state (53
percent). What is also notable is that Leh is the only location
where Muslim contraceptive use (89 percent) is higher than
that of Buddhists (78 percent), which suggests the influence
of the pronatalist movement on Buddhist women’s fertility.16
What emerges from my hospital survey is the following:
Muslim fertility is not as high as perceived; contraceptive
use is extensive throughout Ladakh; and disparities between
Buddhist and Muslim reproductive behaviors are not as

political context, religious and “cultural” groups such
as the LBA can mobilize and unify Buddhists, even as it
conceals divisions that erupt within their own community.
The pronatalist movement reflects this sense of Buddhist
vulnerability and re-emerged in recent years in response to
the politicized debates about Ladakh’s population. Members
of Buddhist community groups and religious leaders have
actively promoted pronatalism and advocated against family
planning through conducting village visits. During these
visits, Buddhist women are told about the population threat,
that family planning is a sin, and encouraged to produce
more Buddhist children. According to a 31-year-old Buddhist
mother in Nubra, the LBA began organizing village visits
there in 2005, and there have been annual meetings there
ever since:
First, LBA comes to Diskit, then they say don’t
do ligation because all our population is going
down and the Muslim population is going up.
Then one day the Muslim population will be
higher than us. Then all the women are scared,
thinking what will happen with our children?

Women in Nubra acknowledged a heightened sense of
worry about the population, although their worries were
highest immediately after village visits, with their worries
dissipating over time. Village visits cause women to have
conflicted feelings about using contraception. For example,

Table 4: Contraceptive use by region and religion
Location
Leh
Kargil
Diskit
Average of three regions

Contraceptive use:
Muslim women
89%
59%
59%
65%

dramatic as perceived.
The perception of high Muslim fertility and Buddhist
vulnerability is not simply due to feeling marginal in relation
to the Indian state. This perception also reflects internal
political tensions within Ladakh, where religious unity and
population strength are considered necessary for securing
political power (van Beek, 2004). Given this complicated
15. Government incentive schemes encourage use of particular
contraceptive methods—paying women 10 rupees to get an IUD inserted
and 600 rupees to get ligation surgery performed.
16. It is important to note that my data is taken from interviews
conducted with women at the hospital, which likely reflects a higher
contraceptive use than those women from far villages who are less likely to
travel to the hospital.
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Contraceptive use:
Buddhist women
78%
83%
83%
80%

Both Buddhist and
Muslim women
80%
62%
75%
75%

a 39-year-old Buddhist woman with two children noted that
she had never regretted having ligation surgery, yet began to
feel regretful during pronatalist village visits. A 50-year-old
Buddhist mother of three from Panamik village told me that
she doesn’t regret her ligation, but now tells her daughter
to give birth to more children than she had. Some women
questioned the pronatalist discourse, noting that it was
difficult for poor women to take care of many children and
that having many children was difficult for women’s health,
two issues often overlooked in village visits. On April 17,
2008, an anonymous letter was posted throughout Leh’s
Main Bazaar, which described apocalyptic warnings about
what would happen to Ladakh’s Buddhist population. Titled
“Where has Ladakh been taken?”, the text includes the

following:
Evil eye has struck. Leaders are paralyzed.
Temples are locked. Buddhists are at a loss.
Unity has been destroyed...Friends have become
enemies and our country has filled with shit.
Leh city is filling up with bad smells. Ladakh
has become a place of fighting. Our leaders’
unity has been broken. Buddhists’ backbone
has broken. The legs of development have been
broken…The Buddhists are divided…All the
Buddhists have lost their shame. There are bars
opening everywhere. The Lineage has become
useless. All girls have become nuns. Brothers
have married the same wife. Countless birth
doors have been closed. Buddhists are going to
be finished [emphasis mine]. We’re at the end
of time. Glaciers have melted away. Untimely
floods have come. Grasshoppers have eaten half
the country. Lamas and monks are mixed in all
kinds of things. The knife is at our throat and
we are blaming each other for murder. Religion
has been harmed. Hey Buddhists, think about
it. Still you have time to think. One day you’ll
have to leave this place. One day you will have
to convert to another religion.

This letter exemplifies the worry of a weakened Buddhism—
by internal conflict, lack of unity, and weak morals. This is
linked to concerns that the Buddhist population is dying
out, indeed, “countless birth doors have been closed” and
“Buddhists are going to be finished.” Though Muslims are not
explicitly addressed in this letter, it is evident that conversion
fears and fertility are linked to cultural survival. Muslim
reaction to Buddhist pronatalism is a general reluctance to
speak about the issue or feigned ignorance. While some
Muslims are sympathetic to Buddhist population worries, they
are not in agreement with the communal undertone of the
pronatalist movement. As a Muslim leader in Leh explained,
“I have sympathy for the LBA position because Ladakh was a
Buddhist country. They are just worried about demographics
changing, so Buddhists are naturally very worried. But they
should not communalize the issue.” The reluctance of Muslims
to react directly and strongly to Buddhist pronatalism is
likely due to worries that the population issue could escalate
already existing tensions between the two groups.

FAMILY PLANNING: SINFUL YET SUPPORTED
Opposition to family planning in Ladakh is expressed
in both religious and political terms. Political opposition
is articulated as an issue of representation, where having a
lower population means less power and visibility within the
state. While religious opposition from Buddhist and Muslim
leaders portrays family planning as sinful, there are distinct
differences between the two religious communities. Buddhists

point to the authority of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, who
himself has made statements about population, where he
both supports family planning and advocates increasing the
Tibetan Buddhist population (Childs, 2008; French, 2003).
The difficulty of reconciling Buddhist principles of nonviolence with the global issue of overpopulation is evident in
the following statement from His Holiness:
From a Buddhist viewpoint, every human
being is precious and one should avoid family
planning and birth control. But then if we look
from the global level, that precious human life
is now overcrowding the world. As a result
not only is it a question of survival of a single
human being but that of the entire humanity.
Therefore the conclusion is that family planning
is necessary provided it is based on non-violent
principles (Childs, 2008: 169).

Although His Holiness the Dalai Lama is revered and
admired by both Ladakhi Buddhists and Muslims, many of
his comments (“every life is precious”) have at times been
utilized to justify Ladakhi pronatalism. Furthermore, many
Ladakhis have noted that there is a discrepancy between what
the Dalai Lama says in English and his speeches in Tibetan,
where he refers more explicitly to the vulnerability of the
Tibetan population and encourages pronatalism. Prominent
Ladakhi Rinpoches have spoken publicly on pronatalism
and contraception, and have made statements that link
contraception to murder (Smith, 2009a, 2009b).
Because many Buddhists equate contraception and
abortion, preventing conception is viewed as a sin (Childs,
2008). The Ladakhi terms for contraception—skye gog/skyes
go thabs (birth control methods); thugu mi skecesi thaps
(methods to not have children); and skezgo kak (to block the
birth canal)—are understood locally as both “birth control”
and “closing the birth canal/birth door” (Norman, 2010).
Thus, the use of contraception blocks the birth door and
prevents the rebirth of another Buddhist. Ladakhi Buddhist
opposition to family planning is more than just recognizing
that life is precious—the use of family planning is specifically
singled out as a sin. While the LBA has been most active
in opposing permanent methods of contraception, many
members are also against temporary methods as well. An expresident of the LBA explained:
When the small family norm was introduced
in India, the medical people actively enforced
it…but now the attitudes are changing. Now
health facilities have improved so we shouldn’t
bother with family planning at all. Monks talk
of both permanent and temporary methods of
family planning as being wrong from a religious
point of view. When you are reborn, the soul
is roaming around somewhere when you stop
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and disrupt the soul with something like family
planning.

From a Buddhist perspective, family planning interrupts
Bardo—the liminal time between death and rebirth—
when souls are reborn (Nyima Rinpoche, 1991). Ligation is
perceived as especially sinful because it permanently “closes
the door” (rgo cukces/rdumces/ban cukces) to a new life.
Temporary methods are more accepted, since women can
have more children later. Most opposition to family planning
is directed at permanent procedures—such as ligation and
abortion—which are stigmatized, even though both remain
legal and available.17 Beginning in 2005-06, stickers detailing
proper moral and reproductive behavior began appearing
throughout Leh, primarily pasted onto buses, store windows,
and even within Leh’s SNM hospital. Produced by the LBA,
the text of the stickers stated:
The four facts:
1. Abortion is a cause to sever oneself from human
rebirth in the next lives.
2. Marriage between close kins is non-virtuous sexual
misconduct.
3. It is an act of partiality if the inheritance is not
equally distributed among brothers and sisters.
4. Disloyal it is, not to have affinity to ones own ethnic
cultural values.
In naming these four premises as “facts,” these stickers link
proper moral behavior with cultural and ethnic obligations.
The “fact” about abortion is that it will continue to negatively
affect women—not just in this lifetime, but also in their
subsequent lives. Thus, abortion and ligation are not only sins
in this lifetime, but will have clear karmic effects into one’s
next life. Some felt that the use of temporary methods—such
as an IUD—could affect the level into which one was reborn.
As a mother from Diskit explained:
I wouldn’t get ligation because it’s a very big
sin. Suppose I die with ligation and then I [am]
never born again as a person. Some people say
this. If menopause comes, I should remove the
IUCD because it is so dikpa [sinful]. If you die
with the IUCD it is so dikpa. Elder people say
this. You should throw it away. [If you die with
the IUD still inserted] also you will not be born
as a human being in the next life.

Every birth that is prevented through contraception deprives
someone else of a human rebirth. Furthermore, one’s sins
17. Though abortion is a sin, there are circumstances where it may
be permitted. “Buddhists are more willing to condemn abortion on moral
grounds than to oppose legislation of it, often being more permissive in
practice than in outlook” (Harvey, 2000: 350). See Harvey, 2000 for a
further discussion on Buddhist ethics.
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come with you during the process of rebirth. This means
that when a woman uses family planning in this life, it will
affect her subsequent level of rebirth, as she will likely be
reborn in a lower kingdom (rung).18
Though there are no karmic consequences in Islam,
there are religious explanations for why family planning is
opposed. Having a child is viewed as a gift of God, and to
prevent that gift (through contraception) is sinful. Permanent
methods, such as abortion and sterilization, are haram and
considered sinful because they cannot be reversed (Mahdavi,
2008; Tober et al, 2006). Engaging in practices considered
haram—such as sterilization—has real life effects on both
women and men. For example, in her writing about family
planning in Kashmir, Sangeeta Chattoo describes the social
ostracization of Kashmiri men who have had vasectomies,
where they are not allowed to enter mosques, which in effect
changes their relationship to God (Chattoo, 1990). Yet, there
is nothing specifically in the Qur’an that argues against
contraception, and religious perspectives on contraceptives
differ greatly across the Muslim world (Hoodfar, 1995;
Mahdavi, 2008). According to Islamic law, the fetus is not
considered to have a soul until 120 days (17 weeks), which
is why it is often permissible to have an abortion in the first
trimester (Mahdavi, 2008; Tober et al, 2006). That abortion
is both permitted and considered a sin indicates the space
within local interpretations of Islam that tolerates birth
control.
In contrast to Buddhist leadership in Ladakh, Muslim
religious leaders and community organizations have not
taken a specific stance against family planning, though some
religious leaders are strongly opposed to it. One Muslim
leader in Leh explained, “If a Muslim woman is sick, then
family planning is allowed. You have not violated Islamic
Shari’a. Abortion is a sin because of killing. Ligation is
allowed. The Muslim community has never made a position
covertly or overtly about family planning.” Though Muslim
leaders may be personally opposed to family planning, they
have not engaged in political activism against it. As the Indian
demographer Alaka Basu has noted, Islamic opposition to
family planning is often more about politics than religion
(Basu, 1996).
Islamic opposition to family planning is contextual,
with exceptions often made for women’s health and other
social conditions. Sameena, an unmarried Muslim girl in
Hundar village, described the complexities surrounding
family planning in Islam, as it is commonly viewed as a sin
in Ladakh but there are also allowances made for it. “Ligation
is a sin. A child is God’s wish. How much children we have is
God’s wish. We cannot go against God’s wishes,” she stated,
18. While one’s level of rebirth may be affected by family planning,
Smith noted that family planning cannot produce certain birth outcomes.
“According to Buddhist women I interviewed, Rinpoches argue that each
child comes with its own sode, or luck, (in this context, it could also be
interpreted as karmic burdens) and thus attempts to produce certain
outcomes through family planning are futile” (Smith, 2009a: 147).

“but family planning is allowed in certain circumstances—
for the very poor, like if they cannot look after the child, or a
situation where the women’s health is in danger or if there is
a rape.” Even with these accommodations, Muslim women’s
reproductive decision making is still constrained by religious
opposition, which is much more notable among Shi’a women
(Grist, 2008; Smith, 2009a, 2009b). Yet, like Buddhist
women, Muslim women stated that family planning was a
sin, yet used contraception and were grateful to be able to
space their families.
Like Muslim and Buddhist women, religious and political
leaders appeared to contradict their public opposition to
family planning. Gynecologists frequently pointed out to
me that the men most vocal in their opposition to family
planning all had fewer than two children. Speaking about
religious leaders, one gynecologist in Kargil noted, “They
always say that family planning is a sin (gunaah; gunha). But
they are sending their wives to the doctors, saying ‘please do
this’ [referring to ligation] but then are lecturing to others
[in the community] not to [get sterilized]. Some say both
[ligation and IUDs] are a sin, some say only ligation…as for
my opinion, it is not a sin in Islam. Islam doesn’t say you
don’t go for family planning. It’s an interpretation of religion.”
Interviews with hundreds of Ladakhis show that support
for family planning is widespread despite the prevalent
discourse that constitutes it as a sin.19
Both Muslim and Buddhist women support family
planning, even as they describe it as a sin and make

Some people say it’s not good, but for my
opinion I feel it’s good…Otherwise we have so
many children who we cannot clothe and feed,
and I think that it also a sin! Other ladies who
already had ligation nobody said anything to
them…in those days, it was easily acceptable,
nowadays, more people are saying negative
things about it.

According to my data from hospital survey, when
specifically asked about “family planning,” 52 percent of
women unequivocally support family planning, 17 percent
support family planning conditionally—after having
“enough” children or through distinguishing temporary
and permanent methods (“ligation is a sin but spacing is
good”). While 13 percent were unsure, only 9 percent were
directly opposed to family planning. Those opposed typically
mentioned the influence of community groups that were
active in pronatalism. Seven percent stated that their support
depended on external factors—such as the health of the
mother, the importance of education, and family/household
security.
This data suggests that total opposition to family
planning in Ladakh is low; that Buddhist women are more
conflicted about family planning than Muslim women; and
that Muslim women are more supportive of family planning
than is often assumed. This runs counter to the strongly held
perception that Muslim women are reluctant to use family

Table 5: Family planning support by religion
Opinion on family planning?
Unequivocal support
Conditional support
Unsure

All women
52%
17%
13%

Buddhist women
49%
15%
17%

Muslim women
58%
21%
6%

Opposed
Support depended on external factors

9%
7%

9%
8%

9%
4%

distinctions between permanent and temporary methods
(see Table 5). Sterilized women characterized ligation as a
sin, yet would add that they had no regrets about choosing
a permanent method of contraception. Some women were
scolded by family members or were made to feel guilty
about their ligation by religious and community members.
A 47-year-old Buddhist woman from Chilling with three
children who had a ligation ten years ago explained:
19. This is based on interviews conducted in Leh, Kargil, Sankoo,
Diskit, Chushot, Chamshen, Panamik, and Hundar. Interviews were with
Buddhists, Muslims (Sunnis, Shi‘as, NurbakShi‘as) and among a wide
variety of groupings (married and unmarried; women and men; doctors and
medical staff; and religious and political leaders)

planning. While most women support family planning,
women tend to join the public discourse about population
worries, rather than take a stance on access to contraception
and family planning.
Children’s education and the increasing costs of raising
children were the most commonly stated reasons women gave
for family planning use. Fertility decisions were linked to
education. As others have noted, changing fertility practices
are often due to a shift in attitude among parents, who begin
to prefer “quality” children to quantity (Greenhalgh, 2005;
Smith, 2009a, 2009b). In Ladakh, pursuing an education
invariably means that children will leave their village
and move to urban sites—such as Leh, Kargil, or outside
Ladakh—to pursue additional education. While their pursuit
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of education may open up new employment opportunities, it
also disproportionately places a higher agricultural burden
on parents and grandparents, who remain in the village (Hay,
1997). Given urban migration and employment transfers,
the decision to limit one’s fertility has become entangled in
wider worries about the strength of Ladakhi culture.
Fertility decision-making presents a paradox, where
having fewer children means less familial security. In a
context where children are expected to take care of aging
parents, the fear of being alone as one ages is salient. Thus,
some parents decide to have more children because they feel
insecure about the survival of their children. A Sunni father
in Kargil district described how child survival and religious
norms took precedence over his desire to have a small family.
The Muslim population is increasing because
people don’t plan families, now we have more
money so (it is) easier to have more children…
my wife had 7 children, 4 died, 3 survived.
I only wanted one boy and one girl…so we
Islamically plan our family but the Indian
government forces us to plan our family. If an
epidemic comes, then what to do?

By “Islamically planning their family,” the Sunni father
saw his wife’s fertility as within God’s hands. This couple
did not use “modern” methods of contraception because it
went against their religious beliefs, instead viewing each
pregnancy as according to God’s wishes. Though it would
appear that concerns about child survival would dissipate
with improvements in reproductive healthcare, many
still worried that a ligated woman could lose her existing
children due to diseases or accidents, which would leave
her childless. Together, the concerns about family security,
changing household composition, and migration underscore
the larger anxieties about population.

THE POLITICIZATION OF REPRODUCTION
“Where else in the world is there an abortion day or a
sterilization day declared at the hospital?” a Buddhist doctor
asked me during an interview. He was referring to the
earlier era of family planning in Ladakh (1980s-90s), when
certain days of the week were set aside at the hospital for
sterilization surgeries, which came to be known as “ligation
day.” The recent elimination of “ligation day” at the hospital
indicates how the politicization of reproduction is impacting
the medical sphere.
Together pronatalism and activism against family
planning have affected the delivery of reproductive healthcare.
Buddhists worried about the population, many of whom are
from the LBA, are associated with a number of politicized
incidents, such as interference with ligation clinics and
anonymous threats against those who work in reproductive
health (Gutschow, 2011). Doctors at Leh’s SNM hospital
describe a staff that is often uncooperative, particularly when
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it comes to abortion or ligation surgeries, which go against
their religious beliefs. Stories abound of hospital staff that
refuse to assist gynecologists with controversial surgeries,
such as ligation and abortion. It has also been rumored
that medical equipment, such as the laparoscope, has been
deliberately vandalized. One gynecologist explained the
constraints she was under:
There are major problems with the staff,
particularly with abortion, the nurses are
uncooperative…they say that when surgeries
are listed on OT [operating theater] list, it’s
too public. Thus, staff say to me to perform
abortions and ligations in the delivery room,
which is more discrete but then the labor room
staff complain, saying ‘why should it happen
here?’

Activism against family planning has targeted Ladakh’s few
gynecologists. One described how a male from the Youth
Wing (an ancillary group within Ladakh’s largest cultural
association, the Ladakh Buddhist Association) told her that
she would have to personally explain to His Holiness the
Dalai Lama why the Buddhist population is decreasing. These
types of statements not only overlook Ladakhi women’s own
agency in choosing to plan their families but also presume
that the Buddhist population is in decline, even though
there is little numerical data to support this. “If you don’t
want family planning, then don’t use it,” one gynecologist
said, a bit exasperated, “but don’t interrupt my work.” After
describing the politicized and tense hospital environment,
one doctor said, “I just want cooperation in the hospital.”
While gynecologists overwhelmingly support family
planning and contraceptive access, most doctors stated their
preference for temporary spacing methods and a desire to
avoid ligation. A male doctor with three children explained,
“I prefer other methods of birth control besides ligation.
(Ligation is) only for those with four or five children, but not
for those with two or three children.” Opposition to ligation
was evident among male doctors, such as the Buddhist
doctor who said, “Ligation should be stopped for at least
10-15 years. Spacing should be there but ligation is not
necessary. Ligation and NSV (nonsurgical vasectomy) should
be stopped entirely.”
In addition to impacting the work of gynecologists,
hospital politics surrounding contraception impacts
women’s access to reproductive healthcare. Most notable
is the significant decline in ligations, which decreased 97
percent between January 2004 and January 2009 (see Table
6). While the average monthly ligation rate at SNM hospital
during 2004-2005 was 41, it had declined to an average of
two surgeries a month by 2008-2009. The rapid decline in
ligation shows the influence of the activism against family
planning. Furthermore, it has also influenced attitudes
towards temporary methods, with a number of village

women telling me in interviews that ligation and IUDs had
become illegal, even though they remain legal and available.
As reproduction has become more politicized in the hospital
setting, it not only impacts the reproductive choices of
Ladakhi women but also creates a culture of surveillance
among the medical staff within the hospital.

and the nation. The idea that Ladakh’s cultural strength
must be preserved is something upon which all Ladakhis
from all regions and religions agree. On the other hand,
these discourses have polarized relations between Muslims
and Buddhists. Characterizations of Buddhist and Muslim
fertility—Buddhists as more vulnerable and Muslim women

Table 6: Ligation decrease at SNM hospital, Leh

CONCLUSION
Population discourses and fertility behavior appear
contradictory in Ladakh. How to explain pronatalist
activists who themselves plan their families? Or the different
perceptions Muslims and Buddhists have about each other’s
population while also sharing similar population anxieties?
Two population discourses—competitive demography
and Ladakhi exceptionalism—unproblematically coexist
in Ladakh, which creates particular kinds of reproductive
subjects (the “hyper-fertile Muslim” and the “vulnerable
Buddhist”). These discourses also have material effects—
generating pronatalism and intensifying hospital politics—
which impact gynecologists, shape women’s reproductive
decision-making, and limit access to care.
Furthermore, these discourses are shaping relations
between and among Buddhists and Muslims, at times
unifying them in a shared Ladakhi identity (via the “Ladakhi
exceptionalism” discourse), at times polarizing them along
religious and regional grounds. On one hand, the population
issue unifies Ladakhis in moments when they feel threatened
and marginalized within the Jammu and Kashmir state

as hyper-fertile and unwilling to use family planning—are
not only deeply entrenched, but also are called upon when
communal tensions erupt.
The politicization of reproduction has put both women
and gynecologists in difficult positions. While gynecologists
are committed to reproductive education and access to
contraception, many are also worried about Ladakh’s
population. Similarly, though women were happy to space
their family, they also felt it was a sin. “We should not do
family planning on the religious side, according to Buddhism,
I did a sin,” a 39-year-old Buddhist woman with two children
explained, though she then smiled and added, “but for myself
it is good.” This comment illustrates the division between
idealized subjectivity (ideals of proper behavior according
to religious affiliations, political pressure, and family
obligations) and practice (where women use birth control).
Ladakhi women are thus left in a difficult position—where
their reproductive decisions are constrained by religion
and politics, yet they express a desire to be able control the
number of children they have.
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